Let H be a class of boolean functions and consider a composed class H ′ that is derived from H using some arbitrary aggregation rule (for example, H ′ may be the class of all 3-wise majority votes of functions in H). We upper bound the Littlestone dimension of H ′ in terms of that of H. The bounds are proved using combinatorial arguments that exploit a connection between the Littlestone dimension and Thresholds. As a corollary, we derive closure properties for online learning and private PAC learning.
Introduction
We study closure properties for learnability of binary-labeled hypothesis classes in two related settings: online learning and differentially private PAC learning.
Closure Properties for Online Learning. Let H be a class of experts that can be online learned with vanishing regret. That is, there exists an algorithm A such that given any sequence of T prediction tasks, the number of false predictions made by A is larger by at most R(T ) = o(T ) than the number of false predictions made by the best expert in H.
Consider a scenario where the sequence of tasks is such that every single expert in H predicts poorly on it, however there is a small unknown set of experts h 1 , . . . , h k ∈ H that can predict well by collaborating. More formally, there is an aggregation rule G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} such that the combined expert G(h 1 , . . . , h k ) exhibits accurate predictions on a significant majority of the tasks. For example, a possible aggregation rule G could be the majority-vote of the k experts. Since we assume that the identities of the k experts are not known, it is natural to consider the class H ′ = {G(h 1 , . . . , h k ) : h i ∈ H}, which consists of all possible G-aggregations of k experts from H. We study the following question: Question 1.1. Can the optimal regret with respect to H ′ be bounded in terms of that of H?
The Littlestone dimension is a combinatorial parameter that determines online learnability (Littlestone, 1987; Ben-David et al., 2009 ). In particular, H is online learnable if and only if it has a finite Littlestone dimension d < ∞, and the best possible regret R(T ) for online learning H satisfies
Furthermore, if it is known that if one of the experts never errs (i.e. in the realizable mistake-bound model), then the optimal regret is exactly d. Thus, the above question boils down to asking whether the Littlestone dimension of H ′ is bounded by a function of the Littlestone dimension of H. One of the two main results in this work provides an affirmative answer to this question (Theorem 2.1).
We next discuss a variant of this question in the setting of Differentially Private (DP) learning. The two settings of online and DP-learning are intimately related (see, e.g., Bun et al. (2020) ; Abernethy et al. (2017) ; Joseph et al. (2019) ; Gonen et al. (2019) ). In particular, both online learning and DP-learning are characterized by the finiteness of the Littlestone dimension (Littlestone, 1987; Ben-David et al., 2009; Bun et al., 2015; Alon et al., 2019; Bun et al., 2020) .
Closure Properties for Differentially Private Learning. Imagine the following medical scenario: consider a family H of viruses for which there is an algorithm A that can learn to diagnose any specific virus h ∈ H given enough labeled medical data. Further assume that A has the desired property of being differentially private learning algorithm as defined by (Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011) ; that is, it is a PAC learning algorithm in which the privacy of every patient whose data is used during training is guarded in the formal sense of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b) .
Assume that an outbreak of a deadly disease h ′ has occurred in several locations all over the world and that it is known that h ′ is caused by some relatively small, yet unknown group of viruses from H. That is, our prior information is that there are unknown viruses h 1 , . . . , h k ∈ H for a relatively small k such that h ′ = G(h 1 , . . . , h k ) for some rule G. For example, G could be the OR function in which case h ′ occurs if and only if the patient is infected with at least one of the viruses h 1 , . . . , h k .
It would be highly beneficial if one could use the algorithm A to diagnose h ′ in an automated fashion. Moreover, doing it in a private manner could encourage health institutions in the different locations to contribute their patients' data. This inspires the following question: Question 1.2. Can one use the algorithm A to privately learn to diagnose h ′ ? How does the sample complexity of this learning task scale as a function of G?
Differential Privacy, Online Learning, and the Littlestone Dimension. Question 1.2 and Question 1.1 are equivalent in the sense that both online learning and DP-learning are characterized by the finiteness of the Littlestone dimension (Littlestone, 1987; Ben-David et al., 2009; Bun et al., 2015; Alon et al., 2019; Bun et al., 2020) .
Note however that unlike the bounds relating the Littlestone dimension to online learning, which are tight up to logarithmic factors (see (1)), the bounds relating the Littlestone dimension and DP-learning are very far from each other; specifically, if d denotes the Littlestone dimension of H then the lower bound on the sample complexity of privately learning H scales with log * d (Bun et al., 2015; Alon et al., 2019) , while the best known 1 upper bound scales with exp(d) (Bun et al., 2020) .
Thus, while our solution to Question 1.1 yields an affirmative answer to Question 1.2, the implied quantitative bounds are far from being realistically satisfying. Specifically, every finite H is learnable with privacy using O(log |H|) samples (Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011) , and so if H is finite and not too large, the bounds implied by the Littlestone dimension are not meaningful. We therefore focus on deriving effective bounds for private learning, which is the content of Theorem 2.2 (see Theorem 7.1 for a precise statement).
Littlestone Classes. It is natural to ask which natural hypothesis classes have bounded Littlestone dimension. First, it holds that Ldim(H) ≤ log|H| for every H, so for finite classes the Littlestone dimension scales rather gracefully with their size.
There are also natural infinite Littlestone classes: for example, let the domain X = F n be an ndimensional vector space over some field F and let H ⊆ {0, 1} X consist of all affine subspaces of V of dimension ≤ d. It can be shown here that Ldim(H) = d. (For example, the class of all lines in R 100 has Littlestone dimension 1.) A bit more generally, any class of hypotheses that can be described by polynomial equalities of a bounded degree has bounded Littlestone dimension. (Observe that if one replaces "equalities" with "inequalities" then the Littlestone dimension may become unbounded, however the VC dimension remains bounded (e.g. Halfspaces).) We note in passing that this can be further generalized to classes that are definable in stable theories, which is a deep and well-explored notion in model theory. We refer the reader to Chase and Freitag (2019) , Section 5.1 for such examples.
Organization. Formal statement of our main results and description of our techniques appears in Section 2, specifically, a short overview of the proofs is given in Section 2.1. Definitions and background results are provided in Section 3. The complete proofs appear in the rest of the paper. Closure properties for Littlestone classes is proved in Section 4. The effective bounds for private learning are given in Section 5 and Sections 6 and 7. We note that each of these parts can be read independently of the other.
Main Results and Techniques
Let G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} be a boolean function and let H 1 , . . . , H k ⊆ {0, 1} X be hypothesis classes. Denote by G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) the following class G(H 1 , . . . , 
In particular, the following bound on c G holds:
In particular, if each of the H i 's has a finite Littlestone dimension then so does G(H 1 , . . . , H k ). Consequently, if each of the H i 's is online learnable, then G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) is online learnable.
Note that the bounds given by our proof escalate rapidly with d = max i {Ldim(H i )} and with k (the arity of G). Thus, Theorem 2.1 is mostly interesting from a theoretical perspective and it will be interesting to derive bounds that increase more gracefully with d and k. Furthermore, it will be interesting to derive an algorithmic proof of Theorem 2.1, which directly bounds the regret/mistake-bound of G(H 1 . . . H k ) in terms of the regret/mistake-bound of the H i 's.
By Alon et al. (2019) ; Bun et al. (2020) , Theorem 2.1 also implies closure properties for DP-learnable classes. However, the quantitative bounds are even worse: not only do the bounds on the Littlestone dimension of G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) escalate rapidly with d and k, also the quantitative relationship between the Littlestone dimension and DP-learning sample complexity is very loose, and the best bounds exhibit a tower-like gap between the upper and lower bounds. For example, if the class of functions H is finite and its Littlestone dimension is ω(log log |H|), then the bound of Theorem 2.1 is most likely to be much worse than the generic application of the exponential mechanism, whose sample complexity is the logarithm of the size of the class. We therefore explore the closure properties of differentially-private learning algorithms directly and derive the following bound.
m i · poly(k, 1/ε, 1/α, log(1/β)).
The exact quantitative satement of the results appears in Theorem 7.1. We remark that closure properties for pure differentially-private learning algorithms (i.e., when δ = 0) are implied by the characterization of (Beimel et al., 2019) . Similarly, closure properties for non-private PAC learning are implied by the characterization of their sample complexity in terms of the VC dimension and by the Sauer-Shelah-Perles Lemma (Sauer, 1972) . However, since there is no tight characterization of the sample complexity of approximate differentially-private learning algorithms (i.e., when δ > 0), we prove Theorem 2.2 algorithmically by constructing a (non-efficient) learning algorithm for G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) from private learning algorithms for H 1 , . . . , H k . Beimel et al. (2015) proved that any proper private learning algorithm in the realizable case 2 can be transformed into an agnostic 3 private learning algorithm, with only a mild increase in the sample complexity. We show that the same result holds even for improper private learning (i.e., when the private learning algorithm can return an arbitrary hypothesis). Furthermore, if the original learner is proper, then the agnostic learner is proper.
We obtain this result by showing that a variant of the transformation of (Beimel et al., 2015) also works for the improper case; we do not know if the original transformation of (Beimel et al., 2015) also works for the improper case. Our analysis of the transformation for the improper case is more involved than the analysis for the proper case.
Technical Overview

Composition for Littlestone Classes
Our proof of Theorem 2.1 is combinatorial. It may be instructive to compare it with an analogous result for VC classes: in their seminal paper, which introduced the connection between the VC dimension and PAC learnability, Blumer et al. (1989) upper bounded the VC dimension of G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) byÕ(d 1 + · · · + d k ), where d i is the VC dimension of H i . Their argument uses the Sauer-Shelah-Perles Lemma (Sauer, 1972) to bound the growth-rate (a.k.a. shatter function) of G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) by some n d 1 +···+d k : indeed, if we let n = VC(G(H 1 , . . . , H k )), then by the definition of the shatter function, 2 n ≤ n d 1 +···+d k , which implies that n =Õ(d 1 + · · · + d k ) as stated. It is worth noting that a notion of growth-rate as well as a corresponding variant of the Sauer-Shelah-Perles Lemma also exist for Littlestone classes (Bhaskar, 2017; Chase and Freitag, 2018) . However we are not aware of a way of using it to prove Theorem 2.1.
We take a different approach: our proof exploits a result by Shelah (1978) which relates the Littlestone dimension to the Threshold dimension: a sequence x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X is Threshold-shattered by H ⊆ {0, 1} X if there are h 1 , . . . , h n ∈ H such that h i (x j ) = ½[i ≤ j]. The Threshold dimension of H, denoted by T (H), is the size of the maximum set which is Threshold-shattered by H. The works of Shelah (1978) and Hodges (1997) imply that the Littlestone and Thresholds dimensions are exponentially related (see Theorem 3.2).
Thus, Ldim(G(H 1 , . . . , H k )) is bounded by some function of Ldim(H 1 ), . . . , Ldim(H k ) if and only if T (G(H 1 , . . . , H k )) is bounded by some function of T (H 1 ), . . . , T (H k ). We prove the latter by arguing contra-positively that if T (G(H 1 , . . . , H k )) is large then T (H i ) is also largish for some i ≤ k. Specifically, if T (G(H 1 , . . . , H k )) ≥ exp(t exp(k)) then T (H i ) ≥ t for some i ≤ k. This is shown using a Ramsey argument that asserts that any large enough sequence x 1 , . . . , x n that is threshold-shattered by G(H 1 . . . H k ) must contain a relatively large subsequence that is threshold-shattered by one of the H i 's. Quantitatively, if n ≥ exp(t exp(k)) then there must be a subsequence x j 1 , . . . , x jt that is threshold-shattered by one of the H i 's.
This yields upper bounds T (G(H 1 , . . . , H k )) by some exp(t exp(k)) where t = max i T (H i ). It is worth noting that an exponential dependence on t is inevitable: we prove in Theorem 4.3 that for any t there exists a class H with T (H) ≤ t such that T ({h 1 ∨ h 2 : h 1 , h 2 ∈ H}) ≥ exp(t). This lower bound is achieved by a randomized construction.
Private learning Implies Agnostic Private Learning
We start by describing the transformation of (Beimel et al., 2015) . Then, it finds using the exponential mechanism a behavior h ′ ∈ H that minimizes the empirical error on the sample. (The exponential mechanism is guaranteed to identify a behavior with small empirical error because the number of possible behaviors is relatively small.) Finally, the transformation relabeles the sample S using h ′ and applies A on the relabeled sample. If A is a proper learning algorithm then, by standard VC arguments, the resulting algorithm is an agnostic algorithm for H. The privacy guarantees of the resulting algorithm are more delicate, and it is only O(1)-differentially private, even if A is ε-differentially private for a small ε. (The difficulty in the privacy analysis is the set of behaviors H is data-dependent. Therefore, the privacy guarantees of the resulting algorithms are not directly implied by those of the exponential mechanism, which assume that the set of possible outcomes is fixed and data-independent.)
When A is improper, we cannot use VC arguments to argue that the resulting algorithm is an agnostic learner. We rather use the generalization properties of differential privacy (proved in (Dwork et al., 2015; Bassily et al., 2016; Rogers et al., 2016; Feldman and Steinke, 2017; Nissim and Stemmer, 2017; Jung et al., 2020) ): if a differentially private algorithm has a small empirical error on a sample chosen i.i.d. from some distribution, then it also has a small generalization error on the underlying distribution (even if the labeling hypothesis is chosen after seeing the sample). There are technical issues in applying these results in our case that require some modifications in the transformation.
Closure for Differentially Private Learning
We prove Theorem 2.2 by constructing a private algorithm A ClosureLearn for the class G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) using private learning algorithms for the classes H 1 , . . . , H k . Algorithm A ClosureLearn uses the relabeling procedure (the one that we use to transform a private PAC learner into a private agnostic learner) in a new setting.
The input to A ClosureLearn is a sample labeled by some function in G(H 1 , . . . , H k ). The algorithm finds hypotheses h 1 , . . . , h k in steps, where in the i'th step, the algorithm finds a hypothesis h i such that h 1 , . . . , h i have a completion c i+1 , . . . , c k to a hypothesis G(h 1 , . . . , h i , c i+1 , . . . , c k ) with small error (assuming that h 1 , . . . , h i−1 have a good completion).
Each step of A ClosureLearn is similar to the algorithm for agnostic learning described above. That is, in the i'th step, A ClosureLearn first relabels the input sample S using some h ∈ H i in a way that guarantees completion to a hypothesis with small empirical error. The relabeling h is chosen using the exponential mechanism with an appropriate score function. The relabeled sample is then fed to the private algorithm for the class H i to produce a hypothesis h i and then the algorithm proceeds to the next step i + 1. As in the algorithm for agnostic learning, the proof that the hypothesis G(h 1 , . . . , h k ) returned by the algorithm is easier when the private algorithms for H 1 , . . . , H k are proper and it is more involved if they are improper.
Preliminaries
This section is organized as follows: Section 3.1 contains basic definitions and tools related to the Littlestone dimension and Section 3.2 contains basic definitions and tools related to private learning.
Preliminaries on the Littlestone Dimension
The Littlestone dimension is a combinatorial parameter that characterizes regret bounds in online learning (Littlestone, 1987; Ben-David et al., 2009 ). The definition of this parameter uses the notion of mistake-trees: these are binary decision trees whose internal nodes are labeled by elements of X. Any root-to-leaf path in a mistake tree can be described as a sequence of examples (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x d , y d ), where x i is the label of the i'th internal node in the path, and y i = if the (i + 1)'th node in the path is the right child of the i'th node, and otherwise y i = 0. We say that a tree T is shattered by H if for any root-to-leaf path (
is the depth of the largest complete tree that is shattered by H.
Definition 3.1 (Subtree). Let T be labeled binary tree. We will use the following notion of a subtree T ′ of depth h of T by induction on h:
1. Any leaf of T is a subtree of height 0.
For h ≥ 1 a subtree of height h is obtained from an internal vertex of T together with a subtree of
height h − 1 of the tree rooted at its left child and a subtree of height h − 1 of the tree rooted at its right child.
Note that if T is a labeled tree and it is shattered by the class H, then any subtree T ′ of it with the same labeling of its internal vertices is shattered by the class H.
Threshold Dimension. A classical theorem of Shelah in model-theory connects bounds on 2-rank (Littlestone dimension) to the concept of thresholds: let H ⊆ {0, 1} X be a hypothesis class. We say that a sequence
Define the threshold dimension, T (H), as the maximum size of a sequence that is threshold-shattered by H. (Shelah, 1978; Hodges, 1997) ). Let H be a hypothesis class, then:
Theorem 3.2 (Littlestone Dimension versus Threshold Dimension
T (H) ≥ ⌊log Ldim(H)⌋ and Ldim(H) ≥ ⌊log T (H)⌋.
Preliminaries on Private Learning
Differential Privacy. Consider a database where each record contains information of an individual. An algorithm is said to preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record of the database (i.e., information of an individual) does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively, this means that the information inferred about an individual from the output of a differentially-private algorithm is similar to the information that would be inferred had the individual's record been arbitrarily modified or removed. Formally: Definition 3.3 (Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b,a) ). A randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring databases S 1 , S 2 ∈ X m (i.e., databases differing in one entry), and for all sets F of outputs,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A. When δ = 0 we omit it and say that A preserves pure ε-differential privacy. When δ > 0, we use the term approximate differential privacy , in which case δ is typically a negligible function of the database size m.
PAC Learning. We next define the probably approximately correct (PAC) model of Valiant (1984) . A hypothesis c : X → {0, 1} is a predicate that labels examples taken from the domain X by either 0 or 1. We sometime refer to a hypothesis as a concept. A hypothesis class H over X is a set of hypotheses (predicates) mapping X to {0, 1}. A learning algorithm is given examples sampled according to an unknown probability distribution P over X, and labeled according to an unknown target concept c ∈ H. The learning algorithm is successful when it outputs a hypothesis h that approximates the target concept over samples from P. More formally:
Definition 3.4. The generalization error of a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} with respect to a concept c and a distribution P over X is defined as
Definition 3.5 (PAC Learning (Valiant, 1984) ). An algorithm A is an (α, β)-accurate PAC learner for a hypothesis class H over X if for all concepts c ∈ H, all distributions P on X, given an input of m samples
where the probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to P and the random coins of the learner A. If the output hypothesis h always satisfies h ∈ H then A is called a proper PAC learner; otherwise, it is called an improper PAC learner.
The previous definition of PAC learning captures the realizable case, that is, the examples are drawn from some distribution and labeled according to some concept c ∈ H. We next define agnostic learning, i.e., where there is a distribution over labeled examples and the goal is to find a hypothesis whose error is close to the error of the best hypothesis in H with respect to the distribution. Formally, for a distribution µ on X × {0, 1} and a function f :
Definition 3.7 (Agnostic PAC Learning). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-accurate agnostic PAC learner for a hypothesis class H with sample complexity m if for all distributions µ on X × {0, 1}, given an input of m labeled samples S = (z 1 , . . . , z m ), where each labeled example
where the probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to µ and the random coins of the learner A. If the output hypothesis h always satisfies h ∈ H then A is called a proper agnostic PAC learner; otherwise, it is called an improper agnostic PAC learner.
The following bound is due to (Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971; Blumer et al., 1989) . 
Suppose that we draw an unlabeled sample
The next theorem, due to (Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1971; Anthony and Bartlett, 2009; Anthony and Shawe-Taylor, 1993) , handles (in particular) the agnostic case.
Theorem 3.9 (VC-Dimension Agnostic Generalization Bound). There exists a constant γ such that for every domain X, every concept class H over the domain X, and every distribution µ over the domain X × {0, 1}:
Notice that in Theorem 3.9 the sample complexity is proportional to 1 α 2 , as opposed to 1 α in Theorem 3.8.
Private Learning. Consider an algorithm A in the probably approximately correct (PAC) model of Valiant (1984) . We say that A is a private learner if it also satisfies differential privacy w.r.t. its training data.
Definition 3.10 (Private PAC Learning (Kasiviswanathan et al., 2011)). Let A be an algorithm that gets an
UTILITY. and Algorithm A is an (α, β)-accurate PAC learner for H with sample complexity m (as in Definition 3.5).
When δ = 0 (pure privacy) we omit it from the list of parameters.
Note that the utility requirement in the above definition is an average-case requirement, as the learner is only required to do well on typical samples. In contrast, the privacy requirement is a worst-case requirement that must hold for every pair of neighboring databases (no matter how they were generated).
The following definition and lemma are taken from Bun et al. (2015) . The Exponential Mechanism. We next describe the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar (2007) . Let X be a domain and H a set of solutions. Given a score function q : X * × H → N, and a database S ∈ X * , the goal is to chooses a solution h ∈ H approximately minimizing q(S, h). The mechanism chooses a solution probabilistically, where the probability mass that is assigned to each solution h decreases exponentially with its score q(S, h):
Algorithm 1 A ExponentialMechanism Input: parameter ε, finite solution set H, database S ∈ X m , and a sensitivity 1 score function q (i.e., |q(D) − q(D ′ )| ≤ 1 for every neighboring D, D ′ ∈ X m ).
Randomly choose
Proposition 3.13 (Properties of the Exponential Mechanism). (i) The exponential mechanism is ε-differentially private. (ii) Letê min f ∈H {q(S, f )} and ∆ > 0. The exponential mechanism outputs a solution h such that q(S, h) ≥ (ê + ∆m) with probability at most |H| · exp(−ε∆m/2). et al. (2011) showed that the exponential mechanism can be used as a generic private learner -when used with the score function q(S, h) = |{i : h(x i ) = y i }| = m · error S (h), the probability that the exponential mechanism outputs a hypothesis h such that error S (h) > min f ∈H {error S (f )} + ∆ is at most |H| · exp(−ε∆m/2). This results in a generic private proper-learner for every finite concept class H, with sample complexity O α,β,ε (log |H|).
Kasiviswanathan
Generalization Properties of Differentially Private Algorithms. In this paper we use the fact that differential privacy implies generalization (Dwork et al., 2015; Bassily et al., 2016; Rogers et al., 2016; Feldman and Steinke, 2017; Nissim and Stemmer, 2017; Jung et al., 2020) : differentially private learning algorithms satisfy that their empirical loss is typically close to their population loss. We use the following variant of this result, which is a multiplicative version that applies also to the case that ε > 1 (as needed in this paper).
Theorem 3.14 (DP Generalization -Multiplicative version (Dwork et al., 2015; Bassily et al., 2016; Feldman and Steinke, 2017; Nissim and Stemmer, 2017) ). Let A be an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm that operates on a database of S ∈ X n and outputs a predicate test : X → {0, 1}. Let P be a distribution over X and S be a database containing n i.i.d. elements from P. Then,
.
Closure of Littlestone Classes
In this section we study closure properties for Littlestone classes. We begin in 
Closure of Littlestone Dimension Under Unions
We begin with two basic bounds on the variability of the Littlestone/Threshold dimension under union. Note that here H 1 ∪ H 2 denotes the usual union:
Moreover, this bound is tight: for every t 1 , t 2 , there are classes
Proof. For the upper bound, observe that if h 1 , . . . , h m ∈ H 1 ∪H 2 threshold-shatters the sequence x 1 , . . . , x m then {h i : 
Proof. There are several ways to prove this statement. One possibility is to use the realizable online mistakebound setting (Littlestone, 1987) and argue that H 1 ∪ H 2 can be learned with at most d 1 + d 2 + 1 mistakes in this setting. We will present here an alternative inductive argument. Towards this end, it is convenient to define the depth of the empty tree as −1, and that of a tree consisting of one vertex (leaf) as 0.
Consider a shattered tree T of depth d = Ldim(H 1 ∪ H 2 ) with leaves labelled H 1 and H 2 in the obvious way. Recall the notion of a subtree in Definition 3.1, and let x ≤ Ldim(H 1 ) be the maximum depth of a complete binary subtree all whose leaves are H 1 leaves, and y ≤ Ldim(H 2 ) the maximum depth of a subtree all whose leaves are H 2 -leaves. Similarly, let x L , y L denote the maximum depth of a H 1 -subtree and a H 2 -subtree in the tree rooted at the left child of the root of T , and let x R , y R be the same for the tree rooted at the right child.
It suffices to show that x + y ≥ d − 1: clearly x ≥ max(x L , x R ) and also x ≥ min(x L , x R ) + 1 thus x ≥ (x L + x R )/2 + 1/2. Similarly y ≥ (y L + y R )/2 + 1/2, hence
and this gives by induction on d (starting with d = 0 or 1) that x + y ≥ d − 1 as required. To see that this bound is tight, pick n ≥ d 1 + d 2 + 1 and set
One can verify that Ldim(H i ) = d i , for i = 1, 2 and that Ldim(H 1 ∪ H 2 ) = d 1 + d 2 + 1, as required (in fact, even the VC dimension of H 1 ∪ H 2 is d 1 + d 2 + 1).
Closure Under Composition
This section is dedicated to proving Theorem 2.1. We start by proving a composition theorem for the threshold dimension in Section 4.2.1, which is later used in Section 4.2.2 to prove Theorem 2.1. Moreover, an exponential dependence in t is necessary: for every t ≥ 6 there exists a class H such that T (H) ≤ t and T {h 1 ∨ h 2 : h 1 , h 2 ∈ H} ≥ 2 ⌊t/5⌋ .
Threshold Dimension
Proof. We begin with the upper bound. Let T (G(H 1 , . . . , H k )) = n. It suffices to show that if n ≥ (2k) 4k·t then there is i ≤ k such that T (H i ) ≥ t. By assumption, there are x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ∈ X and functions
Construct a coloring of the edges of the complete graph on [n] by 2k colors: For each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, the color of the edge {i, j} is an ordered pair (r, ε) where 1 ≤ r ≤ k and ε ∈ {0, 1} are determined in the following manner. Since
there is an index r so that h ir (x j ) = h jr (x i ), set r to be the smallest (or any) such index and set ε = h ir (x j ) (thus h jr (x i ) = 1 − ε). By Ramsey Theorem (Ramsey, 1930) if n ≥ (2k) 2t·2k = (2k) 4k·t then 4 there is a monochromatic set A of size 2t. Denote the elements of A by A = {i 1 < j 1 < i 2 < j 2 < · · · < i t < j t }, and let (r, ε) denote the color which is common to all pairs in A. Thus, x j 1 , x j 2 , x j 3 , . . . , x jt is thresholdshattered by the functions h i 1 ,r , h i 2 ,r , . . . , h it,r (either in this order, or in the opposite order, depending on whether ε = 1 or ε = 0). Hence the threshold dimension of H r is at least t. This completes the proof of the upper bound.
Lower Bound. We next prove the lower bound. Let m = 2 ⌊t/5⌋ , and construct H ⊆ {0, 1} m randomly as follows: H consists of 2m random functions H = {f 1 . . . f m , g 1 . . . g m }, where for each i set f i (j) = g j (j) = 0 for j > i, and for j ≤ i, pick uniformly at random one of f i , g i , set it to be 1 in position j and set the other to be 0 in position j. All of the above m−1 2 random choices are done independently. By construction, {h 1 ∨ h 2 : h 1 , h 2 ∈ H} threshold-shatters the sequence 1, 2, . . . , m with probability 1 and hence has threshold dimension at least m. It suffices to show that with a positive probability it holds that T (H) ≤ 2k, where k = (2 + 1 log m ) log m = 2⌊t/5⌋ + 1. Indeed, 2k = 4⌊t/5⌋ + 2 ≤ t whenever t ≥ 6. We set out to prove that T (H) ≤ 2k,. Consider the following event:
Note that E implies that T (H) ≤ 2k and therefore it suffices to show that Pr[E] > 0. Towards this end we use a union bound: we define a family of "bad" events whose total sum of probabilities is less than one with the property that if none of the bad events occurs then E occurs. The bad events are defined as follows: for any pair of subsets A, B ⊆ [m] of size |A| = |B| = k, let B A,B denote the event B A,B := "For every i ∈ A there exists r i ∈ {f i , g i } such that r i (j) = 1 for all j ∈ B."
Note that indeed ¬E implies B A,B for some A, B and thus it suffices to show that with a positive probability none of the B A.B occurs. We claim that
Indeed, for a fixed i ∈ A, the probability that one of f i , g i equals to 1 on all j ∈ B is at most 2 −(k−1) . By independence, the probability that the latter simultaneously holds for every i ∈ A is at most 2 −k(k−1) . Thus, the probability that B A,B occurs for at least one pair A, B is at most
where the last inequality holds because k = (2 + 1 log m ) log m.
Littlestone Dimension
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Set d = max i {Ldim(H i )} and t = max i {T (H i )}. By Theorems 3.2 and 4.3:
Private Agnostic Learning and Closure of Private Learning
In this section we describe our private learning algorithm. We start by discussing a relabeling procedure (discussed in 2), explaining the difficulties in designing the procedure and how we overcome them. We then provide a formal description of the relabeling procedure in A Relabel and prove that it can be used to construct a private algorithm that produces hypothesis that has good generalization properties; this is done by presenting an algorithm A RelabelAndLearn . Let H be a hypothesis class, and suppose that we have a differentially private learning algorithm A for H for the realizable setting. That is, A is guaranteed to succeed in its learning task whenever it is given a labeled database that is consistent with some hypothesis in H. Now suppose that we are given a database S sampled from some distribution P on X and labeled by some concept c * (not necessarily in H). So, S might not be consistent with any hypothesis in H, and we cannot directly apply A on S. Heuristically, one might first relabel the database S using some function from H, and then apply A on the relabeled database. Can we argue that such a paradigm would satisfy differential privacy, or is it the case that the relabeling process "vaporises" the privacy guarantees of algorithm A?
Building on a result of Beimel et al. (2015) , we show that it is possible to relabel the database before applying algorithm A while maintaining differential privacy. As we mentioned in the introduction, the relabeling procedure of Beimel et al. (2015) instantiates the exponential mechanism in order to choose a hypothesis h that is (almost) as close as possible to the original labels in S, uses this hypothesis to relabel the database, and applies the given differentially private algorithm A on the relabeled database to obtain an outcome f . Now we want to argue that f has low generalization error. We known (by the guarantees of the exponential mechanism) that the hypothesis h with which we relabeled S has a relatively small empirical error on S (close to the lowest possible error). Via standard VC arguments, we also know that h has a relatively small generalization error. Therefore, in order to show that the returned hypothesis f has low generalization error, it suffices to show that error P (f, h) is small. This might seem trivial at first sight: Since as A is a PAC learner, and since it is applied on a database S labeled by the hypothesis h ∈ H, it must (w.h.p.) return a hypothesis f with small error w.r.t. h. Is that really the case?
The difficulty with formalizing this argument is that A is only guaranteed to succeed in identifying a good hypothesis when it is applied on an i.i.d. sample from some underlying distribution. This is not true in our case. Specifically, we first sampled the database S from the underlying distribution, then based on S, we identified the hypothesis h and relabeled S using h. For all we know, A might completely fail when executed on such a database (not sampled in an i.i.d. manner). 5 Therefore, before applying A on the relabeled database, we subsample i.i.d. elements from it, and apply A on this newly sampled database. Now we know that A is applied on an i.i.d. sampled database, and so, by the utility guarantees of A, the hypotheses f and h are close w.r.t. the underlying distribution. However, this subsampling step changes the distribution from which the inputs of A are coming from. This distribution is no longer P (the original distribution from which S was sampled), rather it is the uniform distribution on the empirical sample S.
This means that what we get from the utility guarantees of A is that error S (f, h) is small. We need to show that error P (f, h) is small.
If A is a proper learner, then f is itself in H, and hence, using standard VC arguments, the fact that error S (f, h) is small implies that error P (f, h) is small. However, if A is an improper learner, then this argument breaks because f might come from a different hypothesis class with a much larger VC dimension.
To overcome this difficulty, we will instead relate error S (f, h) and error P (f, h) using the generalization properties of differential privacy. These generalization properties state that if a predicate t was identified using a differentially private algorithm, then (w.h.p.) the empirical average of this predicate and its expectation over the underlying distribution are close. More formally, we would like to consider the predicate (h⊕f )(x) = h(x) ⊕ f (x), which would complete our mission because the empirical average of that predicate on S is error S (f, h), and its expectation over P is error P (f, h). However, while f is indeed the outcome of a differentially private computation, h is not, and we cannot directly apply the generalization properties of differential privacy to this predicate. Specifically, our relabeling procedure does not reveal the chosen hypothesis h.
We overcome this issue by introducing the following conceptual modification to the relabeling procedure. Let us think about the input database S as two databases S = D•T . In the relabeling procedure we still relabel all of S using h. We show that (a small variant of) this relabeling procedure still satisfies differential privacy w.r.t. D even if the algorithm publicly releases the relabeled database T . This works in our favour because given the relabeled database T we can identify a hypothesis h ′ ∈ H that agrees with it, and by standard VC arguments we know that error P (h, h ′ ) is small (since both h, h ′ come from H). In addition, h ′ is computed by post-processing the relabeled database T which we can view as the result of a private computation w.r.t. D. Therefore, we can now use the generalization properties of differential privacy to argue that error D (f, h) ≈ error P (f, h), which would allow us to complete the proof. We remark that the conceptual modification of treating S as two databases S = D•T is crucial for our analysis. We do not know if the original relabeling procedure of Beimel et al. (2015) can be applied when A is an improper learner.
In Algorithm 2 we formally describe A Relabel . We next provide an informal description of the algorithm. Let H be a hypothesis class, and let q be a score function. Algorithm A Relabel takes two input databases D, T ∈ (X × {0, 1}) * , where the labels in D and T are arbitrary. The algorithm relabels D and T using a hypothesis h ∈ H with near optimal score q(D, h). The output of this algorithm is the two relabeled databasesD andT . Observe that algorithm A Relabel is clearly not differentially private, since it outputs its input database (with different labels). Before formally presenting algorithm A Relabel , we introduce the following definition.
Definition 5.1. Let X be a domain and let H be a class of functions over X. A function q : (X × {0, 1}) * × H → R has matched-sensitivity k if for every S ∈ (X × {0, 1}) * , every (x, y), (x ′ y ′ ) ∈ X × {0, 1}, and every h, h ′ ∈ H that agree on every element of S we have that
In words, a score function q has low matched-sensitivity if given "similar" databases it assigns "similar" scores to "similar" solutions. Note that if a function q has matched-sensitivity 1, then in particular, it has (standard) sensitivity (at most) 1.
Example 5.2. Let H be a concept class over X. Then, the score function q(S, h) that takes a labeled database S ∈ (X × {0, 1}) * and a concept h ∈ H and returns the number of errors h makes on S has matched-sensitivity at most 1.
Algorithm 2 A Relabel Global parameters:
• H is a concept class over a domain X,
• q : (X × {0, 1}) * × H → R is a score function with matched-sensitivity at most 1 (see Definition 5.1), which given a labeled database assigns scores to concepts from H, Inputs: Labeled databases D, T ∈ (X × {0, 1}) * . We denote S = D•T .
1. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p ℓ } be the set of all unlabeled points appearing at least once in S.
2. Let H = Π H (P ) = {h| P : h ∈ H}, where h| P denotes the restriction of h to P (i.e., H contains all patterns of H when restricted to P ).
3. Choose h ∈ H using the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter ε=1, score function q, solution set H, and the database D.
Relabel S using h, and denote the relabeled databases as
We next present an algorithm A RelabelAndLearn and analyze its properties. This algorithm is an abstraction of parts of A PrivateAgnostic and A ClosureLearn and is used for unifying the proofs of privacy and correctness of these algorithms. We start with an informal description of algorithm A RelabelAndLearn . The algorithm first applies the relabeling algorithm A Relabel and then applies a private algorithm to the relabeled database. For the analysis of our algorithms in the sequence, A RelabelAndLearn also publishes part of the relabeled database. We prove that A RelabelAndLearn guarantees differential privacy w.r.t. to the part of the database that it did not publish.
where the last inequality is because h
t 2 agree on every point in D and because q has matchedsensitivity at most 1.
For every h ∈ Π H (K) and t ∈ {1, 2}, let w t,h be the probability that the exponential mechanism chooses either h (0)
Step (3) of the execution of A Relabel on S i . We get that for every h ∈ Π C (K),
2 ) + 1])
We are now ready to conclude the proof. For every h ∈ Π H (K), let I t be the event that the exponential mechanism chooses in Step (3) of the execution on S t either h (0) t or h
(1) t and h t be the random variable denoting the pattern that the exponential mechanism chooses in Step (3) of the execution on S t conditioned on the event I t . Observe that S h 0 and S h 1 are distributions on neighboring databases; thus, applying the differentially private A on them satisfies differential privacy, i.e., for every possible sets of outputs F of A:
Recall that algorithm A RelabelAndLearn returns three outcomes: the relabeled database V h , hypothesis h that is consistent with V h , and the output of algorithm A. As h is computed from V h , we can consider it as post-processing and ignore it, and assume for the the privacy analysis that A RelabelAndLearn only has two outputs: V h and the output of algorithm A. Also recall that the database V is fixed, and observe that once the hypothesis h is fixed (in Step (3) of algorithm A Relabel ), the relabeled database V h is also fixed. Furthermore, for every h ∈ Π H (K) we have that V h (0)
t agree on all of V . Let F ⊆ (X × {0, 1}) * × R be a set of possible outcomes for algorithm A RelabelAndLearn , where R is the range of algorithm A. For every h we denote
Observe that for every h ∈ Π C (K) we have that
2 agree on all points in V . We calculate,
The next claim proves that A Relabel returns a hypothesis whose score is close to the hypothesis with smallest score in the class H.
Claim 5.4. Fix α and β, and let S = D•T ∈ (X × {0, 1}) * be a labeled database such that
. .
Consider the execution of
As H contains all patterns of H restricted to S, the set H contains a pattern f * s.t. q(D, f * ) = min c∈H {q(D, c)}. Hence, Proposition 3.13 (properties of the exponential mechanism) ensures that the probability of the exponential mechanism choosing an h s.t. q(D, h) > min c∈H {q(D, c)} + α is at most
Let f denote the hypothesis returned by A and let h be a hypothesis consistent with the pattern chosen on Step (3) 
Proof. Let h be the third output of A RelabelAndLearn , i.e., a hypothesis from H that is consistent with V h .
Since h and h agree on V and |V | is big enough, by Theorem 3.8, with probability at least 1 − β (over sampling V ),
Since |D| is big enough, by Theorem 3.9 (applied to H ⊕ H and the distribution µ that samples x according to P and labels it with 0), with probability at least 1 − β,
We will now use the generalization properties of differential privacy to argue that error P (f, h) is small. By Lemma 5.3, algorithm A RelabelAndLearn is (O(1), O(δ))-differentially private w.r.t. the database D. In addition, by post-processing the outcomes of A RelabelAndLearn (the hypotheses f and h) we can define the following predicate test :
Similarly,
Recall that test is the result of a private computation on the database D (obtained as a post-processing of the outcomes of A RelabelAndLearn ). Also observe that since A RelabelAndLearn is (O(1), O(δ))-differentially private, it is in particular, O(1), O δ + β |D| -differentially private for every choice of β and |D|. Hence, assuming |D| ≥ O 1 α log 1 β , Theorem 3.14 (the generalization properties of differential privacy) states that with probability at least 1 − O(δ|D| + β),
So, by (5), (6), and (7), with probability at least 1 − O(β + δ|D|)
Thus, the next inequality, which concludes the proof, holds with probability 1 − O(β + δ|D|). (3) and (8)) (4)).
6 Private PAC Implies Private Agnostic PAC
In this section we show that private learning implies private agnostic learning (with essentially the same sample complexity) even for improper learning algorithms. Algorithm A PrivateAgnostic , the agnostic algorithm for a class H, first applies algorithm A Relabel on the data and relabels the sample using a hypothesis in H that has close to minimal empirical error, and then uses the private learning algorithm (after sub-sampling) to learn the relabeled database.
Algorithm 4 A PrivateAgnostic
Inputs: A labeled sample S ∈ (X × {0, 1}) m . Auxiliary algorithm: A private learner A for the concept class H.
1. Partition S into S = D•T , where |D| = |T | = |S|/2.
Execute
A Relabel with input D, T and score function q(D, h) = |D| · error D (h) to obtain relabeled databasesD,T .
3. Execute a private empirical learner onD: Choose |D|/9 samples with replacements fromD. Denote the resulting database by Q and let f ← A(Q).
4. Return f . , with probability at least 1 − β (over sampling S), the following event occur.
We continue with the analysis assuming that this event occurs, and show that (w.h.p.) the hypothesis f returned by the algorithm has low generalization error. Consider the execution of A PrivateAgnostic on S. In
Step (2) we apply algorithm A Relabel to obtain the relabeled databasesD,T . Let h ∈ H be a hypothesis extending the pattern used by algorithm A Relabel to relabel these databases. By Claim 5.4, assuming that |D| is big enough, with probability at least 1 − β it holds that
In this case, by Event E 1 we have that
Recall that A is executed on the database Q containing |D|/9 i.i.d. samples fromD. By Lemma 3.12, with probability at least 1 − β, the hypothesis f chosen in Step (3) satisfies
By Lemma 5.5 and (11) with probability at least 1 − O(β + |D|δ)
Finally, by (10) and (12) error µ (f ) ≤ error P (f, h) + error µ (h) ≤ ∆ + O(α). 
To prove Theorem 7.1, we present A ClosureLearn -a generic transformation of private learning algorithms A 1 , . . . , A k for the classes H 1 , . . . , H k respectively to a private learner for G(H 1 , . . . , H k ). This transformation could be applied to proper as well as improper learners, and to a learners that preserves pure or approximate privacy. Given a labeled sample S of size N , algorithm A ClosureLearn finds hypotheses h 1 , . . . , h k in steps, where in the i'th step, the algorithm finds a hypothesis h i such that h 1 , . . . , h i have a completion c i+1 , . . . , c k to a hypothesis G(h 1 , . . . , h i , c i+1 , . . . , c k ) with small error (assuming that h 1 , . . . , h i−1 have a good completion). In the i'th step, A ClosureLearn relabels the input sample S so that the relabeled sample is realizable by H i . The relabeling h is chosen using A Relabel in a way that guarantees completion to a hypothesis with small empirical error. That is, using an appropriate score-function in A Relabel (i.e., in the exponential mechanism), it is guaranteed that for the hypotheses h 1 , . . . , h i−1 computed in the previous steps there are some c i+1 ∈ H i , . . . , c k ∈ H k such that the function G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , h, c i+1 , . . . , c k ) has a small loss with respect to the original sample S. The relabeled sample is fed (after subsampling) to the private algorithm A i to produce a hypothesis h i and then the algorithm proceeds to the next step i + 1.
Algorithm 5 A ClosureLearn
Input: A labeled sample S ∈ (X × {0, 1}) N , where N will be fixed later. Auxiliary Algorithms: Private learners A 1 , . . . , A k for the class H 1 , . . . , H k respectively.
1. Partition S into k parts S = S 1 •S 2 • · · · •S k -the size of the S i will be determined later.
For every
to obtain relabeled databasesD i ,T i .
(c) Execute a private empirical learner onD i :
i. Choose |D i |/9 samples with replacements fromD i . Denote the resulting database by Q. ii. Execute the private learner A i on the sample Q with accuracy parameters (α/k, β/k) and privacy parameters (ε = 1, δ). Let h i be its output.
3. Output c = G(h 1 , . . . , h k ).
In Lemma 7.2, we analyze the privacy guarantees of A ClosureLearn . In the next lemma we prove that A ClosureLearn is an accurate learner for the class G(H1, . . . , H k ). Proof. Let h 1 , . . . , h k be the hypotheses that A ClosureLearn computes in Step (2c). We prove by induction that for every i ∈ [k] with probability at least 1 − O(i)·β k + O(i · δ|S i |) there exist c i+1 ∈ H i+1 , . . . , c k ∈ H k such that error P (G(h 1 , . . . , h 
The induction basis for i = 0 is implied by the fact that the examples are labeled by some G(c 1 , . . . , c k ) from G(H 1 , . . . , H k ). For the induction step, assume that there are c i ∈ H i , . . . , c k ∈ H k such that error P G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , c i , c i+1 , . . . , c k ) ≤ O(i − 1) · α k .
We need to prove that with probability at least 1 − O(1)·β
Recall that each example in S, and hence in S i , is chosen i.i.d. from the distribution in P. Since 
by Theorem 3.9 applied to G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) ⊕ G(H 1 , . . . , H k ), with probability at least 1 − β k (over the sampling of S i ) the following event occurs: Event E 1 : ∀c ∈ G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) we have |error P (c) − error S i (c)| ≤ α k .
We continue proving the induction step assuming that E 1 occurs. The proof of the induction step is as follows:
Since E 1 occurs: (G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , c i , c i+1 , . . . , c k )) ≤ error P (G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , c i , c i+1 , . . . , c k )) + α k ≤ (O(i − 1) + 1)α k .
By the definition of H, there is h = h opt ∈ H that agrees with c i on S i , and therefore q(S i , h opt ) ≤ |S i | (O(i − 1) + 1)α k .
By Claim 5.4, if
then with probability at least 1 − β k , the exponential mechanism returns h ∈ H such that
We assume that the above event occurs, thus, the latter implies that there are c ′ i+1 , . . . , c ′ k such that error S i (G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , h, c ′ i+1 , . . . , c ′ k )) ≤ (O(i − 1) + 2)α k .
Since E 1 occurs, by (18),
Since
Lemma 3.12 implies that Step (2c) of A ClosureLearn is an ( α k , β k ) empirical learner and, therefore, with probability at least 1 − β k error D i (h, h i ) = error D h i (h i ) ≤ α k .
Again, we assume in the rest of the proof that the above event occurs. By Lemma 5.5, since
with probability at least 1 − O(β) k − O(δ|D i |)
Thus, by (21), with probability at least 1 − O(β)
The latter, combined with (19), implies the induction step: with probability at least 1 − O(β) k − O(δ|D i |) error P (G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , h i , c ′ i+1 , . . . , c ′ k )) ≤ error P (G(h 1 , . . . , h i−1 , h, c ′ i+1 , . . . , c ′ k )) + error P (h, h i )
By (15), (17) For constant k, α, β this is nearly tight. By using sub-sampling (see e.g., Kasiviswanathan et al. (2011); Beimel et al. (2014) ), we can achieve (ε, O(δ))-differential privacy by increasing the sample complexity by a factor of O(1/ε). Furthermore, by using private boosting Dwork et al. (2010) , one can start with a private algorithm that is, for example, (1/4, β) accurate and get a private algorithm that is (α, β) by increasing the sample complexity by a factor of O(1/α), and by simple technique, one can boost β by increasing the sample complexity by a factor of O(log(1/β)). Thus, we get an (ε, O(δ))-differentially private (α, β)accurate learner for G(H 1 , . . . , H k ) whose sample complexity is O k i=1 m i (1/4, 1/2, 1, δ) ε · poly(k, 1/α, log(1/β)).
